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REVIEW OF INCONSISTENCIES IN MEXICO?S PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION OF JULY 2nd 2006 


Contents 
Summary and Conclusions 
Page 
INTRODUCTION 5 
I. MACRO PROBLEMS 5 
II MICRO PROBLEMS 13 
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF INCONSISTENCIES 14 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 14 
V. THE DEMAND FOR A BALLOT-BY-BALLOT RECOUNT 16 


REVIEW OF INCONSISTENCIES IN MEXICO?S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
OF JULY 2nd 2006 


SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

Mexico?s presidential election of July 2nd 2006 was apparently a close race between the two leading 
candidates: Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) and Felipe Calderón (FC). Nonetheless, many 
question marks have been raised about the process of vote counting and the environment that 
prevailed before the day of election. These are the grounds on which large groups of people find the 
results unacceptable or demand further certainty that irregularities did not represent a biased pattern 
across the process against AMLO. If such question marks are ignored, major and possibly increasing 
protests are likely to take place. A president elect who lacks high credibility would find it very 
difficult to lead government, especially when he should face very difficult decisions. To name a few: 

(1) The new president will find that public spending was growing at very high rates since the end of 
2005 and may have gone out of control at this stage ? arresting it will be essential to make 
enough room to implement new programs. Yet this calls for a degree of authority that cannot be 
challenged. 
(2) Since 2005 it has become clear that maintaining the volume of oil production is all the time 
more difficult. To decide the focus of priorities and implement the necessary discipline in 
Pemex will require great capacity to negotiate and freedom from vested interests. 
(3) Tax collection has been falling as a result of reductions in income tax rates which have not been 
offset by new sources of tax revenue The difficulties of finding the right mix of taxes between 
income, VAT, and social security contributions are compounded by high levels of tax evasion 
and by the promise of a flat rate for income tax made, perhaps naively, by FC during the 
campaign. This flat rate would cause in our estimation a further reduction in tax revenue of 2 
percentage points of GDP, given the high concentration of collection, if the rate is set at a 
significantly lower level than the present top rate. 
Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


 (4) Public sector pension systems record increasing deficits which are until now covered by 
budgetary transfers from the federation, but this strategy is not feasible over the medium to long 
term and, moreover, it is unwise. Solving this problem will require not only a financial strategy 
(on which the current administration has a proposal, yet exceedingly costly), but mainly a 
political negotiation with unions, which must be led by the President. 
(5) Bank credit for the private sector remains highly concentrated on consumer loans and is 
unlikely to be diverted to business loans without the Government creating the right incentives. 
Banks will naturally prefer to continue lending for consumption, where margins are very high 
and risk is low, but this not desirable or healthy for global resource allocation. 
(6) Some major effects from NAFTA-liberalization of corn have already been felt and thus caused 
emigration to the northern border, major cities and the US. The impact of the final stage of tariff 
reduction scheduled for January 2008 will be felt early next year, however, as the tariff will fall 
to a level sufficiently low to displace Mexican producers, while US agriculture continues to be 
subsidized. Negotiations on this sector ought to be starting now; for any government to lack a 
clear course on this major problem will be recipe for further social tension. 
These are major reasons why Mexico needs a presidency strong enough to emerge from 

the election, if not in terms of the share of votes, at least in not being challenged on moral 

grounds. It will be impossible for a government to succeed in all political negotiations and 

policy implementation without an aura of legitimacy. 

Thus, the treatment of claims over all aspects of the election by the Federal Electoral 

Tribunal will be essential for medium-term confidence and macro stability. The claims we 

discuss have been coming from different parties, including citizens, and need further analysis 

before conclusions can be reached on their impact on votes. Information is still flowing at the 

closing of this report, such that new data will have to be included for a fair assessment. At this 

stage, however, there are sufficient grounds to allow people to shape an opinion or at least to 

know the main objections to the election. The complexity of the electoral process in some 

instances suggests that undertaking a thorough and independent examination of all substantial 

claims may not be feasible now, when the impartiality of the entity in charge of the vote count 

Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


(IFE ? Mexican Electoral Institute) is in doubt. This gives rise to the growing demand for a 
ballot-by-ballot recount, which will probably continue to grow in coming weeks. 

Since the evening of July 2nd, evidence which casts doubts on the certainty of electoral 
results has included many points. Below is a summary. 

(1) IFE failed to name a likely winner on the night of the election, even though it had Felipe 
Calderón (FC) ahead of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) by 1% of the vote, a 
respectable figure of 400,000 votes. 
(2) There were 283,448 fewer votes for President than for senators. In many ?adjacent? voting 
stations (?contiguas? in IFE parlance), there were no votes cast for President. 
(3) In states where AMLO was leading, the difference between votes for senator and votes for 
president was the largest (in favour of senator votes). In states where FC was leading, the 
difference between votes for president and those for senator was the largest (in favour of 
president votes). The extreme cases were Tabasco (96,450 votes less for President) and 
Nuevo León (41,290 votes more for President). In six states were AMLO led, votes for 
President were less than those for senator by 313,882. In states where FC led, votes for 
President were more than those for senator by 111,178. 
(4) On July 2nd-3rd, IFE had counted tally sheets of 117,000 voting stations, leaving aside 13,000 
voting stations because they had anomalies that called for further examination. Although the 
result in favour of FC with the count of 117,000 stations was 1%, the result of the 13,000 
stations that were counted later 4% in favour of AMLO. Thus, the question arises as to how 
such a large sub-set of voting stations had a different structure of votes than the 117,000 
voting stations. Furthermore, IFE never explained what the inconsistencies of the 13,000 
stations were and how it could resolve them within hours on July 3rd. When the PREP count 
was concluded with a difference in favour of FC of 0.6%, its reliability had been put under 
serious doubt. 
(5) Following PREP, the next stage of the electoral count was the count by district, which 
involves a count of tally sheets in all 300 districts. During this count district councils are 
authorized to open ballot boxes for a manual recount of votes. AMLO?s coalition demanded 
52,000 boxes to be opened on the grounds of irregularities that were visible in varying 
degrees. District councils only authorized opening 2,873 boxes. IFE did not explain what had 
Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


been the outcome of such recounts, except that in 95% of cases the number of ballots 
differed from the data in tally sheets. Absence of a detailed report lent itself for each party 
showing counts from individual districts. According to Ricardo Monreal of AMLO?s 
coalition, the recount of these boxes gave AMLO an additional 102,000 votes. Only 15 days 
later did IFE issue aggregate figures of the recount, indicating that opening 2,830 boxes had 
resulted in lower figures of votes for all candidates. It did not explain, although this may be 
understood, that these reductions applied to the basis of PREP figures. 
The reported reduction in votes runs counter to the figures on upward revisions on votes for 
all parties resulting from district count with respect to the PREP. The total votes that were 
recorded in district count in addition to those in PREP were 3,164,684 votes, of which 
AMLO received 1,131,844. 

(6) The count by districts resulted in the amendment of many discrepancies between tally sheets 
and the PREP, some of which had been identified on July 2nd-3rd. It also included those 
voting stations that had been left out of the PREP. As was mentioned, votes for all three 
candidates were found to be greater than in PREP, including for Roberto Madrazo (RM). But 
AMLO?s additional votes were 16.3% greater than the additional votes for FC and 15.8% 
greater than the additional votes for RM, both significant differences. 
(7) With the results of district count, the small margin of error that IFE had indicated the PREP 
count would have (0.03%) was significantly exceeded: the correction over the first PREP 
result was 8.7 percent. 
(8) Intervention of President Fox in favour of FC and against AMLO in the form of statements 
to the press and commentaries to business groups has been documented extensively and now 
rests with the Electoral Tribunal. AMLO?s coalition considers that this intervention made the 
election unfair. 
(9) Intervention of Secretary of Communications, Mr. Pedro Cerisola, in favour of PAN is also 
documented and rests with the Electoral Tribunal. 
(10) Claims that the electronic counting of votes was biased and therefore showed paths not 
typical of stochastic processes have been submitted by professional analysts and 
mathematicians and may justify further enquiries 
(11) An on-going analysis of null votes (Walter Mebane and Yuriko Takahashi, of Cornell 
University --see http://polmeth.wustl.eduy), which is part of their analysis of elections in the 
US and now in Mexico, has shown an abnormally high number of null votes in Guanajuato 
Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


 and Nuevo Leon. In these states AMLO?s coalition had a low level of representation at the 
stations (33.9% in Guanajuato). This analysis uncovers a positive correlation between high 
numbers of null votes and abnormally low votes for AMLO. 

This report has been based on official information from the IFE and analysis offered by 
analysts who examined the vote counting process throughout July 2nd-6th. It also draws on part of the 
information that AMLO?s coalition has made available. 

INTRODUCTION 

This report discusses why Mexico?s presidential election has raised many doubts on its rectitude and 
aroused protests among voters who believe that results of such election should be disputed. 

Doubts arise from three different sets of problems: 

(1) Macro problems regarding aggregate vote figures released during the vote counting period 
and also regarding the electronic system employed by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE); 
(2) Micro problems, arising from irregularities in 52,000 of the 130,477 voting stations in the 
country?s 300 electoral districts; and 
(3) Environmental problems surrounding the campaigns, especially forces external to the 
political parties that may have hurt the election impartiality, objectivity, legality, and 
certainty that the law requires of any election 
I. - MACRO PROBLEMS 
Macro problems became evident as early as 8 pm on July 2nd, when the pollsters, encouraged by the 
IFE did not ? as was scheduled - release results from their exit polls. 

Rapid count 

During the election on July 2, the PAN?s exit polls had established a lead for FC over 

 Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


AMLO. This created incentive for PAN vote promoters to call for votes from PRI supporters in 
districts where votes were still being cast, under the argument that ?the PRI had collapsed and the 
race remained only for AMLO or FC to win?. It also allowed vote promoters of PAN to seek votes 
in poor districts, sometimes in exchange for money. Some cases of vote buying have been 
documented, yet no attempt to measure their aggregate impact has been made. 

One example was the teachers? leader Elba Esther Gordillo, who called PRI governors in 
northern states, urging them to induce votes in favour of PAN, as the PRI was apparently falling 
behind. Ms. Gordillo is on record calling the governor of Tamaulipas, Eugenio Hernández and 
asking him to help votes for FC and to ?sell? this as a favour to FC. Documentation of this call now 
rests with the Federal Electoral Tribunal in the file submitted by AMLO?s coalition calling for 
ballot-by-ballot recount. 

At 11 pm, the IFE explained that it would not release rapid count figures because the 
difference in voter preference between PRD candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) and 
PAN candidate Felipe Calderon (FC) was too close and both candidates had at various times 
alternated in the lead. 

The absence of rapid count figures and of exit polls alarmed many who had constantly raised 
questions about the independence of the IFE?s council from government institutions or parties close 
to the government. One case is that of the leader of the teachers? union, Elba Esther Gordillo, who 
was instrumental in the appointment of the council in 2003. 

In the absence of rapid count reports, observers? only references were the most recent polls 
before the election and exit polls from firms retained by various parties. In 10 polls previous to the 
election, shown in Annex 1 on page 7, six showed AMLO in the lead; one showed him tied with FC; 
and three showed FC in the lead. In the evening of July 2nd, the pollster retained by AMLO 
(Covarrubias) obtained the result that AMLO was ahead of FC by 1.2% of the vote; in the end, this 
pollster gave him 2.5 percentage points above FC. Two other pollsters retained by PAN (Arcop and 
Gea-Isa) showed FC ahead by 2 and 3.2 percentage points respectively. 

Both candidates claimed to have won the election based on these polls as soon as IFE 
announced that it could not name a winner. 

Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


 ANNEX 1LAST POLLS BEFORE ELECTION AND RAPID COUNT STATISTICS 
Percentages of votes 

POLLSTER CALDERON AMLO 
Last Polls: 
Zogby 35 31 
Parametria 33 37 
Indemerc 32 33 
Gea-Isa 41 36 
Marketing Politico 37 34 
El Universal 34 36 
Mitofsky 33 36 
BGC 34 34 
Reforma 34 36 
Demotecnia 31 35 
Rapid Counts: 
AMLO Pollster Rapid Covarrubias) 37.1 34.6 
FC Pollster Rapid (Arcop) 37 35 
FC Pollster Rapid (Gea) 33.4 36.6 

Source: http://www.opinamexico.org/encuestas-electorales.phtml 

The announcement of the IFE at 11 pm was ambiguous. It mentioned that although FC was 
ahead of AMLO by 1.0% of the vote in the as yet unfinished PREP count, it could not take this for 
granted and that reliable results would only come from the district count starting on July 5th. The 
PREP system was counting all tally sheets as they were coming from the 300 electoral districts, a 
process that continued through July 3rd. 

Program of Preliminary Electoral Results (PREP) 

The PREP system aroused additional questions and suspicions owing to three problems: 

(1) Early advantage for Felipe Calderón granted by order of vote count 
The IFE caused, by the order of its vote counting, an early and high advantage for FC over AMLO. 
This was by counting first votes from districts in which FC was expected to lead, even though these 
districts are in the north. There has not been an answer to why the IFE did not start counting and 
reporting the results from Mexico City, where the early advantage would have been for AMLO. 
Questions remain regarding a possible attempt to create a bias that would benefit FC once a 
difference in his favour was established and remained for the entire count. 

 Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


(2) Regular difference in percentages of votes for FC steady at 1% 
Once an early lead was established for FC in the count of PREP, the votes accumulated through 
subsequent vote counting exhibited a regular pattern of slow convergence: FC percentage was 
falling, while AMLO?s was rising. After 1 am of July 3rd, the accumulated votes showed a 
permanent lead of 1% of the vote in favour of FC, insensitive to the entry of new districts in which 
either AMLO or FC were significantly ahead of each other. This is unlikely to happen in stochastic 
processes, such as a close election, where voting reports kept flowing from districts. These 
anomalies of the PREP are described separately, in Annex. 

 (3) Larger number of votes for Senator than President 
An interesting finding is that the number of votes for senator exceeded those for President by 
283,448. This is significant for various reasons: 

(a) More people could vote for President than for Senators, as many special voting stations were 
placed to allow travelers to cast a vote only for President at a district other than their home. 
(b) There were 40,000 votes for President cast abroad and processed by IFE. 
(c) The absence of any vote for President was more frequent in voting stations ?adjacent? to the 
main voting station, which suggests vote shaving in only some stations. Alternatively, the 
explanation would be that in many adjacent stations voters rejected all presidential candidates 
when they had not rejected them in the main voting station. 
(d) In states such as Tabasco, where AMLO was leading, there were 96,450 fewer for President 
than for Senator. Similarly, senatorial votes far exceeded the vote for president in other states 
where AMLO led, such as Michoacán, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Chiapas, and DF (in total 313,882 
less votes in the six states). In contrast, in states where FC was leading, there were more votes 
for President than for Senator. This is the case in Nuevo León (41,290 more votes for 
President), Sinaloa, Baja California, Morelos, Sonora, and Chihuahua (111,178 more votes for 
president in all seven states). 
Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


(e) In states such as Tabasco and Michoacan, the difference between votes for Senator and those 
for President meant that in each voting station many voters did not cast a ballot for President 
when they had done so for senator. In Tabasco this number would have been 41 on average 
per voting station. In Michoacan it would have been 11. 
(f) Voters in many stations had to stay in line for half an hour, one hour or even longer before 
they could cast their votes, suggesting a motivation to vote. The intense presidential campaign 
had made the names of presidential candidates and their personalities well known to the 
voters, which was not the case with candidates for senate seats, whose names are often ignored 
by the public. The table showing differences in such votes by state is in Annex 3 below. 
Annex 3 
Votes for President and votes for senators in election of July 2nd 2006 

Per Sheet Per Sheet 
Votes Votes Difference Sheets Sheets Difference Votes Votes Difference 
State President Senator President Senator President Senator 
Tabasco 718,416 814,866 -96,450 2,374 2,368 6 303 344 -41 
Michoacán 1,313,117 1,368,485 -55,368 5,347 5,329 18 246 257 -11 
Veracruz 2,666,041 2,714,639 -48,598 9,140 9,121 19 292 298 -6 
Oaxaca 1,153,159 1,201,205 -48,046 4,445 4,437 8 259 271 -12 
Distrito Federal 4,690,671 4,723,960 -33,289 12,134 12,100 34 387 390 -3 
Chiapas 1,055,039 1,087,170 -32,131 4,745 4,735 10 222 230 -8 
Guanajuato 1,845,784 1,866,223 -20,439 6,070 6,057 13 304 308 -4 
Puebla 1,888,115 1,902,631 -14,516 5,989 5,975 14 315 318 -3 
San Luis Potosí 848,240 862,698 -14,458 3,071 3,067 4 276 281 -5 
Tamaulipas 1,117,642 1,131,324 -13,682 3,909 3,898 11 286 290 -4 
Yucatán 684,968 698,111 -13,143 2,111 2,108 3 324 331 -7 
México 5,482,214 5,490,474 -8,260 15,304 15,260 44 358 360 -2 
Nayarit 321,583 324,785 -3,202 1,391 1,386 5 231 234 -3 
Quintana Roo 351,542 354,670 -3,128 1,130 1,130 0 311 314 -3 
Campeche 271,606 273,791 -2,185 893 897 -4 304 305 -1 
Zacatecas 486,638 488,741 -2,103 2,382 2,379 3 204 205 -1 
Coahuila 881,567 883,082 -1,515 3,060 3,049 11 288 290 -2 
Baja California Sur 163,554 164,811 -1,257 650 648 2 252 254 -2 
Durango 491,269 490,987 282 2,153 2,140 13 228 229 -1 
Hidalgo 898,121 896,671 1,450 3,035 3,027 8 296 296 0 
Guerrero 824,863 823,025 1,838 4,383 4,372 11 188 188 0 
Tlaxcala 401,489 399,388 2,101 1,252 1,247 5 321 320 1 
Jalisco 2,769,407 2,767,274 2,133 8,029 8,006 23 345 346 -1 
Querétaro 625,686 623,244 2,442 1,790 1,781 9 350 350 0 
Aguascalientes 403,094 400,343 2,751 1,224 1,221 3 329 328 1 
Colima 243,602 239,355 4,247 759 757 2 321 316 5 
Chihuahua 1,019,833 1,014,653 5,180 4,258 4,239 19 240 239 1 
Sonora 837,721 831,501 6,220 2,974 2,965 9 282 280 1 
Morelos 689,629 681,531 8,098 2,049 2,037 12 337 335 2 
Baja California 902,433 890,087 12,346 3,472 3,462 10 260 257 3 
Sinaloa 798,587 760,643 37,944 4,247 4,231 16 188 180 8 
Nuevo León 1,703,721 1,662,431 41,290 5,001 4,985 16 341 333 8 
SUM 38,549,351 38,832,799 -283,448 128,771 128,414 11 287 290 -3 

Source: Elaborated with data from PREP system through 6 pm of July 3rd 2006 

This analysis contradicts some simplistic explanations that have been offered regarding this 
difference, which they argue is caused by voters not liking any of the presidential candidates, but 
still showing a preference for a senator. 

 Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


With regards to the operation of adjacent stations, voter disenfranchisement, or removal from 
the voter registration list, occurs frequently; in some cases by error and in others by design. The 
disenfranchised voter, when he attempts to vote at the assigned polling place, will find that he is not 
on the list. He is then directed to so-called ?adjacent stations?, where he is allowed to vote if his 
voter registration card is deemed to be valid. 

There are thousand of incidents reported in the ?adjacent? voting stations. In many stations, 
large numbers of PAN voters were found to vote early at adjacent stations, which consumed the 
supply of available ballots (750) that were allocated to the voting station. In many cases, these 
voters were on the registration list, but merely went to the adjacent station and used up the ballots. 
Subsequent voters who wanted to cast a ballot were unable to do so for lack of ballots. These would 
be those voters who were removed from the voter registration list, who were predominantly voters 
for AMLO?s coalition. This has been documented as a result of many notes sent by frustrated voters. 
See (http://www.juliohernandez.com.mx). 

Accumulation of doubts on the reliability of the PREP system grew during the night of July 
2nd and early morning of the 3rd, as was attested by many members of the press and analysts who 
followed the process on the web. AMLO indicated shortly after 11 pm that he was claiming victory 
based on his own pollster?s exit polls. FC claimed victory based on the still incomplete reading of 
PREP, which gave him a 400,000 vote lead. Roberto Madrazo (RM) completely disqualified the 
PREP as a reliable count and indicated he should wait for the following stage, i.e. the recount of 
tally sheets by electoral district councils. Developments are described in Annex 4. 

District count 

After PREP was concluded, the second stage of the vote count and the definitive one in the process 
is the count by the 300 district councils of all tally sheets. This process started on July 5th, being the 
only opportunity for each party?s representative to express doubts on the correct data in tally sheets 
and consequently to demand that boxes from certain stations are opened and votes recounted. 

District councils rejected most of the demands from AMLO?s coalition to open up boxes. 
AMLO?s coalition demanded to open 52,000 boxes, but councils only agreed, frequently with great 

Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


reluctance, to open only around 2,873 boxes. AMLO was credited with additional votes for 
President in the following cases, although other cases have been mentioned by commentators: 

In Tabasco, 20,000 votes more for AMLO over votes for FC 
In Zacatecas, 6,000 votes more for AMLO over votes for FC 
In Nuevo León, 9,000 votes more for AMLO over votes for FC 
In Durango, 1,200 votes more for AMLO over votes for FC 
In Coahuila, 20,000 votes more for AMLO over votes for FC 

In addition, in Aguascalientes (a state governed by PAN) there were missing ballots for 
President in the boxes of 10 voting stations which the councils examined partially. Differences 
between votes for President and those for Senators varied between 94 and 193 votes in each of the 
ten voting stations. 

District councils, usually under the lead of the representatives of IFE or PAN refused to 
allow for more boxes to be opened. Perhaps for that reason, the recount of tally sheets followed the 
same pattern as the PREP. This does not save the PREP, however, from serious criticisms. For one 
thing, the PREP had not included 3 million votes in the count of July 2nd-3rd, which it explained had 
to be excluded in order to avoid delays as part of an agreement with all political parties dating last 
February. Nevertheless, the IFE had omitted to mention that these votes were excluded in all its 
communications on vote count through July 3rd. 

For another, the IFE had stated that the PREP system had a degree of error of 0.03 percent. 
The actual error of the PREP in the case of votes for AMLO can be established as follows: 

When the PREP?s count established a lead of FC at 1%: 
Votes for AMLO were 13,575,091; 
When the PREP counted some of the 3 million votes originally set aside: 
Votes were 13,624,506 -- (error of 0.4% in preliminary count); 
With district count after opening 2,873 ballot boxes: 
Votes 14,756,350 -- (error of 8.7% in preliminary count and of 8.3% in final PREP.) 


It must be noted that the district count resulted in upward adjustments in votes for president 


 Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


for all candidates, including RM. Nevertheless, the adjustment obtained for AMLO was 16.3% 
higher than the adjustment for FC and 15.2% than the adjustment for RM, differences that are 
significant. 

In addition, the percentages of votes reported at the end of district count (35.89% for FC and 
35.31% for AMLO) were calculated over the number of total votes including annulled votes. If their 
votes had been weighted against the total of valid votes only, the shares of both candidates would 
have exceeded 36%. If the officially reported percentages were to be maintained at 35.89% and 
35.31%, however, it might mean that there are still 1.168 million votes still unaccounted for. IFE has 
not explained this anomaly or corrected the percentages accordingly. 

Thus, considering many technical allegations on the improbability of such a regular pattern 
to occur in such an election and discrepancies found between tally sheets and ballot boxes whenever 
these were opened, the demand to count vote by vote introduced by AMLO has gained broad 
support from many parties, including members of other coalitions. One key issue is that the public 
has become increasingly aware of the findings of additional votes that reduce the margin of 
difference in favour of FC as any new iteration in the counting of votes has been done. 

While this demand has gained strength in the public?s opinion, IFE representatives had 
access to ballot boxes sitting in the 300 districts over the past two weeks, boxes which had been 
sealed after the district count. IFE representatives opened boxes without legal authority, without 
informing public opinion or the political parties. When they were discovered by observers and 
AMLO denounced them on Wednesday July 12th, IFE explained that it wanted to confirm votes in 
some cases and to satisfy request of information from the Electoral Tribunal. 

The electoral law prohibits any box being opened in the absence of all political parties? 
representatives. AMLO?s coalition has confirmed that the Electoral Tribunal made no such request 
to the IFE. 

Thus, a tentative conclusion is that the district count and the IFE lack the confidence of at 
least one major party and of a large number of voters. On Tuesday July 11th PAN also submitted 
claims to examine and eventually annul a large number of ballots from voting stations. If PAN 

Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


articulates a case claiming vote or tally sheet irregularities, then the credibility of the district count 
will be further eroded and hence the credibility of the IFE. 

II. - MICRO PROBLEMS 
These are numerous problems such as: 

(1) Double counting of votes for PAN in the PREP; i.e. votes in tally sheets entered twice into 
PREP. 
(2) Differences in votes between tally sheets and PREP figures, usually against AMLO and in 
favour of FC. 
(3) Identical number of votes for FC in ?basic? voting stations as in ?adjacent? voting stations, 
especially in districts where FC was ahead of AMLO. 
(3) Large number of annulled votes in districts in favour of AMLO. 
(4) Insufficient ballots for voters in districts favoring AMLO. 
(5) An inexplicably larger number of votes for President than for Senators, as was described above. 
This seems to happen only in some states and in some voting stations, but further analysis is 
needed to reach conclusions on the nature of this anomaly. 
For a sample of these problems, see Annex 6. It is impossible to determine the bias that 
might be attributed to these problems. It is clear from claims laid by AMLO?s coalition that in the 
majority of cases of ballot boxes opened, the number of votes is different from than reflected in tally 
sheets. This gives grounds to the demand for opening at least 52,000 boxes where irregularities were 
noted. As this represents 39.8% of all voting stations, the demand is now simply to open all ballot 
boxes if doubts on this election are going to be solved satisfactorily. 

One example of how haphazard the decision to open up boxes was during district count can 
be seen in the case of a district in Querétaro. Here the representative from the IFE was against 
opening the box, but exceptionally the representative of PAN supported the petition to open. In this 
case the tally sheet had listed 200 votes for FC more than votes were in the box. The tally sheet was 
corrected accordingly. 

 Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


III. - SIGNIFICANCE OF INCONSISTENCIES 
As much information in the media continues to flow and while AMLO has submitted his case to the 
Electoral Tribunal, citizens continue to scrutinize information available on the election and to bring 
their findings to interested parties or to the press. 

One claim that has been discussed at length already is the suspicious trends in both the PREP 
count and the district count, as was described in annexes 3 and 5. These trends have called the 
attention of pollsters and mathematicians, who have suggested that only an administration of data 
processing with a particular end in mind would be capable of yielding the regular difference 
observed between the percentage of votes for AMLO and that for FC during the two counts, i.e. the 
PREP and the district count. 

>From the many anomalies that remain unexplained, the errors exhibited in data sheet and the 
likely bias against AMLO found in many vote recounts, the neutrality and impartiality of the IFE is 
at a stake. 

Not resolving the doubts hanging over the vote counting, the election, arguably the most 
hotly-contested in Mexico?s history, will lack credibility and the president elect will find it very hard 
to govern. 

IV. - ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
This election was unusually contaminated by the intervention of external forces which, apart from 
the political parties, were making an effort to shape voters? opinions and influence the thinking of 
groups, such as business, investors, owners of new houses, and beneficiaries of social programs in a 
way favourable to one candidate (generally FC) and unfavourable to another (generally AMLO). 

President Fox?s attempts to harm AMLO?s public image by discrediting the merits of his 
proposed economic strategy and warning against the danger of changing such a strategy has been 

Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


established beyond any doubt. The instances in which Fox referred to AMLO or to his proposals in a 
negative way in press conferences or in comments to reporters have been documented and now rest 
with the Electoral Tribunal. 

In addition, perhaps as a result of President Fox?s campaign and perhaps also because of 
uncertainty regarding AMLO?s economic program on taxes and tax privileges, the Consejo 
Coordinador Empresarial (CCE) ran TV spots that ought to have caused anxiety among the public, 
as they referred to the likelihood of currency devaluations, loss of personal savings, or loss of 
property for people if the current economic strategy were to change. 

On top of this, PAN conducted the most significant part of its campaign describing AMLO 
as a ?danger to Mexico?, comparing him with Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela, and warning 
voters that he would increase the public debt and cause an economic crisis. 

AMLO?s coalition asked IFE, who has sufficient authority, to order a cancellation of these 
TV campaigns. IFE?s council turned down unanimously AMLO?s claim that the ?danger to Mexico? 
spot was defamatory and ought to be taken off the air. The spot continued to run on TV until the 
Electoral Tribunal determined that it was against the law. By that time, the negative campaign had 
already damaged AMLO?s image in the public?s eye. 

Similarly, IFE reacted tardily to the CCE spot on imminent economic crisis and requested its 
removal. The CCE refused until IFE threatened with a court order, but by the time it was removed, it 
had caused damage to AMLO. 

IFE on many occasions asked President Fox to refrain from intervening in the campaigns and 
from making comments that could be interpreted as directed against one candidate. Fox continued 
with his own campaign and only at times adjusted his behavior temporarily, without changing his 
stance or his readiness to comment at any time against AMLO. 

On July 3rd the Minister of Communication, Mr. Pedro Cerisola, is on record for having 
called the governor of Tamaulipas, Eugenio Hernández, thanking him for the votes he induced for 
PAN. Mr. Cerisola advised the governor to speak with PAN?s President, Mr. Manuel Espino, and 
hear about another way in which the PAN needed some ?help?. 

 Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


On the basis of time consumed on radio and TV, the spending of PAN, CCE and other 
business organizations in the negative campaign against AMLO amounted to $100 million only for a 
week prior to the election. This represents a considerable burden against the fairness of the election, 
even more so because total spending of PAN exceeded the limits on campaign spending authorized 
by IFE. Although in the end these figures will have to be examined in light of evidence by the 
Electoral Tribunal, the impression in many of AMLO?s followers is that external forces should not 
have been allowed by IFE to damage this campaign. 

V. - THE DEMAND FOR A BALLOT-BY-BALLOT RECOUNT 
The difference of votes counted by IFE and by the district councils in favour of FC over AMLO is 
only 243,934. While so many claims exist of unfairness in this election owing to the intervention of 
forces external to the political parties and of those authorities entitled to take part in it, and while so 
many doubts arise regarding the rectitude of the vote counting, it has become necessary to obtain 
total certainty regarding the rightful winner. 

It is more likely that discrepancies between ballots and tally sheets exist in poor districts, 
where voters have low levels of education and might be unable to follow all instructions to cast a 
vote properly. As AMLO support is strongest in these districts, null votes may be biased. Thus, the 
demand to recount votes is reasonable. 

It is possible that criteria in the voting stations to annul votes were not applied in a 
homogenous way across the country. Although the law indicates that votes must be annulled when 
voters indicate more than one preference, many of the annulled votes that AMLO?s coalition is 
submitting to the Tribunal do not suffer from this anomaly. Thus, it is possible that citizens who 
made decisions regarding the votes in the voting stations were not sufficiently trained to make the 
right choices and decisions. Again, this risk is higher in poorer districts. The high number of 
annulled votes (2.2% of the total) deserves further examination in light of the high rate of 
participation of people and of the abnormally high share of these votes in Guanajuato and Nuevo 
León. Furthermore, the association is close between a low figure of votes for AMLO and 
abnormally high figures of null votes, at least in some states. 

Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006 


A large difference in the amount of resources which the two main political forces had for this 
campaign allowed PAN to have representatives at each of the 130, 477 voting stations. While 
responsibility for having assigned representatives falls entirely on the organization of AMLO?s 
coalition, this does not justify that any of the other parties including IFE, overlooked irregularities at 
the voting station. Given the claim of major irregularities, it is thus appropriate to ensure that 
improper practices were not being replicated on a major scale. 

 21 July 2006 

List of Annexes 
Annex 1 Last poll before the election and rapid count statistics 
Annex 2 Anomalies in steady difference of votes between FC and AMLO from 1 am of 3 July 
Annex 3 Votes for President and for senators and differences by state 
Annex 4 Chronology of the vote count 
Annex 5 Paradoxes of district count of tally sheets. 
Annex 6 Sample of micro problems affecting many vote districts 

 Ecanal Special Report No. 1, July 2006